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THE PARENT TRAP: CONSTITUTIONAL 
VIOLATIONS AND THE FEDERAL TORT 
CLAIMS ACT’S DISCRETIONARY  
FUNCTION EXCEPTION 
Abstract: On June 2, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
sitting en banc in Castro v. United States held that the discretionary func-
tion exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) does not subject 
the United States to liability when a government employee, acting within 
his discretion, commits a constitutional violation, even if that violation is 
coupled with a state tort claim. The dissent asserted that such constitu-
tional violations should not be understood to be within the discretion of a 
government employee to commit. This Comment argues that the major-
ity approach is correct, as it is the most consistent with Supreme Court 
precedent and the purposes of the FTCA. 
Introduction 
 In 2003, Monica Castro, an American citizen, saw her American 
infant Rosa removed from the country by the U.S. border patrol as part 
of the deportation proceedings of the child’s father.1 The border patrol 
was not forthcoming as to where Rosa was sent, and Ms. Castro would 
not see Rosa again for three years, at which point Rosa did not recog-
nize her own mother.2 In 2006, Ms. Castro sued the United States un-
der the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for violations of her daughter’s 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights; she also sued for violations of 
state tort law, including unlawful detention and unlawful removal of 
her daughter from the country by the border patrol.3 
 The United States moved to dismiss, arguing that sovereign immu-
nity barred the suit under the “discretionary function” exception to the 
FTCA.4 The FTCA is a limited waiver of the government’s sovereign 
immunity, and the discretionary function exception specifically excludes 
                                                                                                                      
1 Adam Liptak, A Family Fight, a Federal Raid, a Baby Deported, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 2010, 
at A17. 
2 Id. 
3 Castro v. United States (Castro I ), No. C-06-61, 2007 WL 471095, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 
9, 2007), rev’d, (Castro II ), 560 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d en banc, (Castro III ), 608 F.3d 
266 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
4 Castro I, 2007 WL 471095, at *4; see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006). 
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from this waiver any action by government employees that involves indi-
vidual judgment based on considerations of public policy.5 Ms. Castro 
argued that violating her daughter’s constitutional rights cannot be un-
derstood as within the discretion of the border patrol.6 The district 
court rejected her argument, concluding instead that the border patrol 
agents’ actions fell within the discretionary function exception to the 
FTCA because they met the discretionary function test enunciated by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1991 in United States v. Gaubert.7 
 On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, a three-judge panel reversed, con-
cluding that the discretionary function exception could not cover con-
stitutional violations when coupled with state tort claims by government 
employees.8 The court then remanded the case to the district court to 
determine if the border patrol had violated the constitutional rights of 
the child.9 On rehearing to the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc, however, 
the court found that the border patrol’s actions satisfied the Gaubert 
test and thus fell within the discretionary function exception.10 Inter-
estingly, Judge Dennis, in his concurrence, agreed that dismissal was 
appropriate but noted that the Gaubert test must be read to exclude 
constitutional violations from the discretionary function exception.11 
 Part I of this Comment introduces the different approaches es-
poused by the en banc majority, by concurring Judge James L. Dennis, 
and by dissenting Judge Carl E. Stewart.12 Part II then examines the 
history of the FTCA and Supreme Court precedent regarding the dis-
cretionary function exception, and tests the three approaches' fidelity 
to this precedent.13 Finally, Part III argues that the majority’s view is the 
strongest because it coherently incorporates Supreme Court precedent 
and, consistently with the FTCA, limits the government’s liability if a 
constitutional violation was not obvious to the government actor.14 
                                                                                                                      
5 See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322–23 (1991). 
6 Castro I, 2007 WL 471095, at *9. 
7 Id. (citing Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322). 
8 Castro II, 560 F.3d at 390. 
9 Id. at 392. 
10 Castro III, 608 F.3d at 268. 
11 Id. at 270 (Dennis, J., concurring). 
12 See infra notes 15–53 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 54–80 and accompany text. 
14 See infra notes 81–104 and accompanying text. 
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I. Baby Deported 
 Ms. Castro, a U.S. citizen, had her daughter, Rosa, in 2002 with an 
undocumented Mexican immigrant, Omar Gallardo.15 Ms. Castro and 
Mr. Gallardo lived together in Texas at the time.16 Ms. Castro alleged 
that her relationship with Mr. Gallardo was abusive, although the abuse 
never extended to their infant daughter, and in November 2003, she 
left their home without her daughter after an argument with Mr. Gal-
lardo.17 Ms. Castro regretted her decision and tried to get her daughter 
back by going to the police and Texas Child Protective Services, but she 
was told that without a custody order, Mr. Gallardo had as much of a 
right to the child as she did.18 Ultimately, Ms. Castro decided to alert 
the U.S. Border Patrol to her husband’s status as an undocumented 
immigrant.19 A border patrol agent told Ms. Castro that they would ap-
prehend Mr. Gallardo and asked her to be present when this occurred 
so they could turn the child to her; Ms. Castro declined to do so out of 
fear.20 As a result, when the border patrol detained Mr. Gallardo, the 
child was taken along with him and detained at the border patrol sta-
tion.21 Ms. Castro then went to the border patrol station, demanded 
her daughter, but the border patrol decided not interfere with the cus-
tody situation after consulting with Child Protective Services.22 The 
border patrol prepared to deport Mr. Gallardo and Rosa in the event 
no custody order was obtained before Mr. Gallardo was to be de-
ported.23 Ms. Castro tried to get the custody order before her husband 
was deported, but she was unsuccessful and her daughter was sent to 
Mexico.24 When Mr. Gallardo was again detained on an attempt to re-
enter the United States illegally in 2006, Ms. Castro worked out a deal 
with him to regain custody of her daughter, and she saw her child for 
the first time in three years.25 
                                                                                                                      
15 Castro v. United States (Castro I ), No. C-06-61, 2007 WL 471095, at *1 (S.D. Tex. 
Feb. 9, 2007), rev’d, (Castro II ), 560 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d en banc, (Castro III ), 608 
F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010). 
16 Castro I, 2007 WL 471095, at *1. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at *2–3. 
20 Id. at *3. 
21 Id. at *2. 
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 In response to Ms. Castro’s suit against the U.S. government, the 
United States claimed that the actions of the border patrol fell within 
the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, and therefore the 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim.26 Generally, 
the United States is immune from suit under the principle of sovereign 
immunity unless it has consented to be sued.27 The FTCA stands as the 
federal government’s consent to be sued for damages to property or for 
personal injury from negligent or wrongful acts by government em-
ployees acting within the scope of their employment.28 But the FTCA 
has exceptions designed to limit its reach.29 One such clause is the dis-
cretionary function exception, which excludes the decisions of policy 
makers exercising their discretion from the FTCA’s waiver of immunity 
regardless of whether that discretion has been abused.30 
 The government asserted that the border patrol’s decision to allow 
Mr. Gallardo to take his daughter with him to Mexico was within the 
agency’s discretion under the test annunciated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1991 in United States v. Gaubert, and therefore the discretionary 
function exception applied.31 In order for actions to be within the dis-
cretionary function exception under Gaubert, two prongs must be satis-
fied: (1) the government employee’s actions cannot be mandated by 
statute, regulation, or policy, and (2) the government employee’s ac-
tions must be rooted in public policy.32 When an employee’s conduct is 
mandated by an applicable statute or regulation, the employee does not 
make a judgment or use discretion, and thus the exception cannot ap-
ply.33 Conversely, when an employee’s decision is not rooted in public 
policy, it is not the sort of choice that the discretionary function excep-
tion is designed to protect.34 An example of such a decision is when a 
government employee crashes a vehicle into another vehicle; though 
such an action involves discretion, it involves no weighing of policy in-
terests.35 
                                                                                                                      
26 Defendant’s Answer at 1, Castro I, 2007 WL 471095 (No. C-06-61). 
27 FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). 
28 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006). 
29 Id. § 2680(a) (2006). 
30 Id. 
31 Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
& Motion for Summary Judgment at 8–9, Castro I, 2007 WL 471095 (No. C-06-61); see 
United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322–23 (1991). 
32 Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322–23. 
33 See id. at 324. 
34 See id.; see also Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 542–43 (1988). 
35 Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325 n.7. 
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 Ms. Castro argued that by deporting her daughter, a U.S. citizen, 
the border patrol acted outside its statutory authority and therefore the 
exception could not apply.36 Further, she argued that the border patrol 
made a custody decision by allowing her daughter to remain with Mr. 
Gallardo, and that such a decision was also beyond the border patrol’s 
statutory authority.37 
 The district court rejected Ms. Castro’s arguments, reasoning that 
the border patrol had not deported Ms. Castro’s daughter or made a de 
facto custody decision, but instead had allowed a minor to accompany 
her father who was being deported when there was no custody order in 
place.38 The district court also found no statute or regulation that the 
border patrol was required to follow in this case.39 Moreover, as the de-
cision of what to do with the child had policy implications, Gaubert was 
satisfied.40 
 On appeal, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the U.S. Constitution can require par-
ticular conduct of government employees in the same way a statute or 
regulation can, and that thus, under Gaubert, a government employee 
violating the Constitution would not be acting within his or her discre-
tion.41 Judge Stewart wrote in the majority opinion that though the 
government did not consent to be sued for mere constitutional viola-
tions through the FTCA, a constitutional violation occurring simulta-
neously with a state tort is not within a government employee’s discre-
tion to commit (the “Stewart approach”).42 The basis for this logic was 
rooted not only in precedent from the Fifth Circuit, but also in case law 
from the First, Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits.43 The court 
                                                                                                                      
36 See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction & Motion for Summary Judgment, Castro I, 2007 WL 471095 
(No. C-06-61). 
37 Id. 
38 Castro I, 2007 WL 471095, at *7 n. 12. 
39 Id. at *8. 
40 See id.; Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323. 
41 Castro II, 560 F.3d at 389. 
42 Id. at 390 (citing Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475). 
43 Id. at 389; see, e.g., Raz v. United States, 343 F.3d 945, 948 (8th Cir. 2003); Thames 
Shipyard & R.R. Repair Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 247, 254 (1st Cir. 2003); Medina v. 
United States, 259 F.3d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 2001); Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1002 
(9th Cir. 2000); Prisco v. Talty, 993 F.2d 21, 26 n.14 (3d. Cir. 1993); Sutton v. United States, 
819 F.2d 1289, 1293 (5th Cir. 1987). Note, however, that two of those decisions stand for 
the Stewart approach only in dicta. See Thames, 350 F.3d at 258 n.9; Medina, 259 F.3d at 225. 
Although these decisions stated that the violation of constitutional rights ought to make 
the discretionary function exception inapplicable, these decisions found no constitutional 
violations. See Thames, 350 F.3d at 258 n.9; Medina, 259 F.3d at 225. 
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also concluded that the border patrol had acted outside the scope of its 
authority because it did not have the statutory authority to detain or 
deport U.S. citizens.44 The court conflated the two concepts of scope of 
authority and constitutional violations toward the end of its opinion, 
stating that although the border patrol has broad power to deport un-
documented immigrants, it does not have the authority to breach con-
stitutional protections.45 The court went on to note that there was a 
plausible argument that the border patrol had violated the child’s con-
stitutional rights and acted outside its statutory authority, and therefore 
remanded the case to the district court.46 
 The dissenting judge argued that the majority’s opinion would 
make the government liable for far more than originally envisioned by 
the FTCA, noting the ease with which one can characterize a state tort 
committed by a government employee as a constitutional violation.47 In 
the dissent’s view, no constitutional violations had in fact occurred be-
cause the child was with her father, who could waive her constitutional 
rights.48 Thus, the dissent understood the majority opinion to be 
flawed in its application of its own test.49 
 The Fifth Circuit sitting en banc disagreed with the three-judge 
panel and dismissed the suit, concluding that the district court had 
properly applied the Gaubert test (the “majority approach”).50 Judge 
Dennis concurred in the judgment, but disagreed that violations of the 
Constitution are covered by the discretionary function exception (the 
“Dennis approach”).51 Judge Dennis agreed with the Stewart approach 
but noted that, in this case, there was no constitutional or statutory vio-
lation committed by the border patrol.52 In dissent, Judge Stewart’s re-
asserted the conclusion reached by the three-judge panel.53 
                                                                                                                      
44 Castro II, 560 F.3d at 390–91. 
45 See id. at 391. 
46 Id. at 392. 
47 Id. at 394 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
48 Id. at 395. 
49 See id. 
50 Castro III, 608 F.3d at 268. 
51 Id. at 269–70 (Dennis, J., concurring). 
52 Id. at 270. 
53 See id. at 273 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Judge DeMoss also dissented; he agreed with 
Judge Stewart’s reasoning but added that because several state tort claims were allowed 
through one proviso in the FTCA, the discretionary function exception was immaterial at 
least as to those claims. Id. at 274 (DeMoss, J., dissenting). 
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II. Weighing the Competing Approaches 
 The disagreement between the majority approach and the Stewart 
approach appears simple: either the discretionary function exception 
covers a government employee’s actions even when they violate a citi-
zen’s constitutional rights, or it does not.54 The U.S. Supreme Court 
has already held that constitutional tort claims are not allowed under 
the FTCA when standing alone: in 1994, in FDIC v. Meyer, the Court 
found that the FTCA did not represent the government’s consent to be 
sued for such claims.55 But it remains an open question as to whether a 
violation of constitutional rights when coupled with state law torts 
should open the government to liability under the FTCA.56 
 The legislative history of the discretionary function exception is 
limited: in its early decisions, the Supreme Court cited to testimony 
from an assistant attorney general and to a few congressional hearings 
to explain what Congress intended the exception to mean.57 Assistant 
Attorney General Francis Shea testified in 1942 that the exception was 
supposed to prevent plaintiffs from questioning the constitutionality of 
laws or regulations in the context of an ordinary tort suit seeking dam-
ages.58 Shea also said that the purpose of the exception was to shield 
the government from liability related to the administration of federal 
programs.59 From this testimony, the Supreme Court has concluded 
that Congress did not intend the FTCA to extend liability for actions by 
government actors that are political or open to policy analysis.60 
 Given the Supreme Court’s understanding of the congressional in-
tent behind the discretionary function exception, the Fifth Circuit’s en 
banc majority approach is a sound one, both from a case law standpoint 
and a logical one: phrasing a tort claim as a violation of constitutional 
                                                                                                                      
54 Compare Castro v. United States (Castro III ), 608 F.3d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 2010) (en 
banc) (per curiam), with id. at 273 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
55 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994). 
56 Compare Castro III, 608 F.3d at 268 (holding that constitutional violations joined with 
state tort claims fall within the discretionary function exception), with Thames Shipyard & 
R.R. Repair Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 247, 254 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that the discre-
tionary function exception does not extend to unconstitutional or unauthorized acts). 
57 See United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 
467 U.S. 797, 809–10 (1984); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 26–27 (1953); see also 
Barry R. Goldman, Can the King Do No Wrong? A New Look at the Discretionary Function Excep-
tion to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 837, 842 (1992); Mark C. Niles, “Nothing But 
Mischief”: The Federal Tort Claims Act and the Scope of Discretionary Immunity, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 
1275, 1302 (2002). 
58 See Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 27; Niles, supra note 57, at 1302. 
59 Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 27. 
60 Id. at 27–28. 
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rights is easily achieved in many cases and could make the discretionary 
function exception practically useless.61 The Fifth Circuit has already said 
as much in a 2006 case, Santos v. United States, where a prisoner sued the 
U.S. government for failing to enforce its nonsmoking regulations within 
a federal prison’s walls.62 Despite the prisoner joining his intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress and negligence claims with a purported vio-
lation of his Eighth Amendment rights, the court found that this was not 
enough to waive the discretionary function exception, citing FDIC v. 
Meyer.63 The claims in Castro parallel those in Santos.64 
 Additionally, the violation of constitutional rights is not always easy 
to perceive,65 and judicial review of potential violations could open the 
government to more liability than it ever intended under the FTCA.66 
In Castro, the border patrol was in a decidedly difficult situation: they 
had an undocumented immigrant who was unwilling to relinquish his 
child on the one hand, and they faced the prospect of taking an Ameri-
can citizen out of the country on the other.67 Although Judge Stewart 
found a plausible argument that the border patrol had committed con-
stitutional violations by citing to Fourth and Fifth Amendment cases, 
these analogies do not particularly apply in the Castro case.68 Whether 
or not the border patrol’s actions amounted to a violation of constitu-
tional rights, it is at least clear that the agents did not engage in activity 
that could easily be characterized as unconstitutional infringement of 
                                                                                                                      
61 Castro v. United States (Castro II ), 560 F.3d 381, 394 (5th Cir. 2009) (Smith, J., dis-
senting) (“The majority’s two-step rubric would go like this: First, allege a constitutional 
violation, thereby avoiding the discretionary function exception. Second, plead a state 
cause of action that overlaps with that constitutional violation, then seek damages under 
that state cause of action. Voila! No more sovereign immunity.”). 
62 See No. 05-60237, 2006 WL 1050512, *1, *3 (5th Cir. Apr. 21, 2006). 
63 Id. at *3 (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994)). 
64 See Castro II, 560 F.3d at 397; Santos, 2006 WL 1050512, at *1. 
65 Compare, e.g., Castro III, 608 F.3d at 270 (Dennis, J., concurring) (finding no constitu-
tional violation), with id. at 273 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (finding a constitutional violation). 
66 See Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 809–10; Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 27–28; Andrew Hyer, Com-
ment, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposal for a Workable 
Analysis, 2007 BYU L. Rev 1091, 1094–96. 
67 Castro v. United States (Castro I ), No. C-06-61, 2007 WL 471095, at *7 (S.D. Tex. 
Feb. 9, 2007). 
68 See Castro III, 608 F.3d at 273 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975); Hernandez v. Cremer, 913 F.2d 230, 237 (5th Cir. 1990)). 
Both of the cases cited by Judge Stewart involved issues unrelated to Castro, namely that one 
cannot be stopped and questioned about citizenship without reasonable suspicion, in United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, and that an American citizen cannot be refused reentry to the United 
States without due process, in Hernandez v. Cremer. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884; Hernan-
dez, 913 F.2d at 237. 
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the child’s rights.69 Indeed, the Dennis approach pointed to the fact 
that "there was no constitutional or statutory violation" committed by 
the border patrol as the major flaw of the Stewart approach.70 
 Nevertheless, working in the Stewart approach’s favor is the natu-
ral repulsion to the idea that a government employee may violate a 
constitutional right with impunity.71 Just as the government would 
likely be exposed to many new areas of liability under the Stewart ap-
proach, other potentially viable claims may be foreclosed under the 
majority’s approach.72 For example, in 2003, in Raz v. United States, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held the government li-
able in a case involving a former Israeli citizen who alleged abuse by the 
FBI, such as wiretapping, stalking, and an illegal search.73 Although the 
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas had dismissed 
the case for failure to state a claim, the Eighth Circuit in reinstating the 
case noted that the FTCA’s discretionary function exception could not 
shield the FBI’s alleged activity because the activity violated the citizen’s 
constitutional rights and therefore was not discretionary.74 Whereas the 
FBI’s actions in Raz clearly implicated the First and Fourth Amend-
ments,75 it is less obvious what constitutional rights were implicated by 
the border patrol’s actions in Castro: the child was with her father, who 
could waive the child’s rights, and it is unclear what due process could 
have been afforded.76 
 The Stewart approach also incorporates the idea that the border 
patrol lacked the statutory authority to take the child out of the coun-
try in the custody of her father.77 It can be implied from Gaubert that 
any such overstepping of statutory authority would fail the first prong; 
if the border patrol were to, for instance, deport a twenty-five year old 
U.S. citizen, it would not be following a statute that only authorizes 
such a procedure for aliens.78 Thus, Judge Stewart’s arguments empha-
sizing the lack of statutory authorization likely stem from disagreement 
                                                                                                                      
69 See Castro III, 608 F.3d at 270 (Dennis, J., concurring). 
70 Id. at 270. 
71 See id. at 273 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
72 See Raz v. United States, 343 F.3d 945, 947 (2003). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 947–48. 
75 Id. at 948. 
76 See Castro III, 608 F.3d at 270 (Dennis, J., concurring). 
77 Id. at 271–72 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
78 See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2006) (giving the Secretary of Homeland Security author-
ity to discharge laws “relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens,” with no 
mention of U.S. citizens); United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991). 
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with the majority’s application of the Gaubert test rather than the 
prongs of the test itself.79 But this argument is unavailing; as Judge 
Dennis’s concurrence observes, the border patrol did not deport a U.S. 
citizen but instead allowed a child to remain with her father when there 
was no custody order in place.80 
III. The Majority Approach’s Coherence with Precedent 
 Some may find the Dennis approach attractive insofar as it holds 
the government liable for constitutional violations but finds no such 
violation in Castro itself.81 The flaw in both the Dennis and Stewart ap-
proach, however, is that there is no logical way to skirt Supreme Court 
precedent definitively stating that the United States has not consented 
with the FTCA to be sued for constitutional violations.82 The Gaubert 
test itself shows that constitutional violations do not fall within the dis-
cretionary function exception: the first prong states that actions man-
dated by statute, regulation, or policy are not discretionary, but does 
not mention actions mandated by the Constitution;83 the second prong 
states that actions must be rooted in public policy, which would hardly 
seem to be true of blatant constitutional violations.84 Unlike the Dennis 
or Stewart approach, the majority approach adheres to this binding 
Supreme Court precedent.85 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that suits against federal officers 
for constitutional torts are not permitted by the FTCA.86 In the Castro 
case, this holding means that if Ms. Castro had sued the government 
through the FTCA only for violations of Rosa’s constitutional rights, the 
case would have been dismissed.87 The reason it was not dismissed is 
that Ms. Castro alleged state tort claims in addition to constitutional vio-
                                                                                                                      
79 See Castro III, 608 F.3d at 271–72 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
80 Id. at 270 (Dennis, J., concurring). 
81 See Castro v. United States (Castro III ), 608 F.3d 266, 270 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(per curiam) (Dennis, J., concurring). 
82 See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994). 
83 Castro v. United States (Castro II ), 560 F.3d 381, 393 (5th Cir. 2009) (Smith, J., dis-
senting) (citing United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991)). 
84 See Morales v. United States, 961 F. Supp. 33, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the le-
gal arrest of an individual was not grounded in public policy); Patel v. United States, 806 F. 
Supp. 73, 878 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that a search by government agents that resulted in 
the burning down of the target’s house was not grounded in public policy). 
85 See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 478; Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322. 
86 Meyer, 510 U.S. at 477–78. 
87 See id. Castro v. United States (Castro I ), No. C-06-61, 2007 WL 471095, at *3 (S.D. 
Tex. Feb. 9, 2007). 
2011 Castro and the Discretionary Function Exemption 67 
lations.88 Because the FTCA only gives permission for the government 
to be sued under state law, and constitutional torts come from federal 
law, a constitutional tort claim cannot be made under the FTCA.89 Even 
when a state tort claim is coupled with a constitutional claim, it seems 
clear that, under FDIC v. Meyer, the constitutional claim would be barred 
by the FTCA.90 As a result, Ms. Castro’s argument that the discretionary 
function exception of the FTCA should not apply because her daugh-
ter’s constitutional rights were violated does not work because at its root 
the FTCA does not allow such suits.91 
 The language of Gaubert also supports this position: whereas “fed-
eral statute, regulation, [and] policy” are included in Gaubert’s first 
prong, there is no mention of the Constitution—an omission that sug-
gests that the Supreme Court did not believe the Constitution should 
be considered when evaluating whether government employees’ ac-
tions fall into the discretionary function exception.92 Judge Stewart 
might respond that the Constitution stands as the rubric to guide all of 
the government’s statutes, regulations, and policies; any violation of the 
Constitution by a government employee should thus be regarded as 
outside her discretion.93 For this point to be correct, however, Meyer 
would have had to be decided differently, as it is simply impossible to 
conform Meyer’s holding that constitutional violations are not to be 
considered in an FTCA context with the Stewart approach.94 
 To answer the Stewart approach’s concern about egregious consti-
tutional violations, the majority can point to the second prong of 
Gaubert as a safeguard against such violations.95 In cases where a par-
ticularly obvious constitutional violation has occurred, a court can find 
that there was no consideration of policy issues in the context of the 
violation, and therefore the government employee’s actions fail 
Gaubert’s second prong.96 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth in 
2000, however, in Nurse v. United States, considered a case where gov-
ernment employees were alleged to have developed unconstitutional 
policies that discriminated on the basis of race.97 Because these em-
                                                                                                                      
88 See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 474; Castro I, 2007 WL 471095, at *3. 
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ployees were formulating regulations as to who gets searched at air-
ports, it is clear that they were weighing policy matters and thus would 
pass the second prong of Gaubert.98 The court nonetheless found that 
discriminatory policies that are unconstitutional would not fall within 
the FTCA’s discretionary function exception.99 The Castro majority ap-
proach would have to formulate a response to this concern by pointing 
to the first prong of Gaubert and looking to see if a statute, regulation, 
or policy had been violated in crafting the regulatory scheme.100 
 The Castro majority approach is simply more in line with the prece-
dent set by Gaubert; the border patrol’s actions were not governed by a 
statute, policy, or regulation, and in deciding whom to remove from the 
country the border patrol engaged in a policy analysis.101 Furthermore, 
Castro demonstrates why Gaubert is good precedent, and why its test fur-
thers the aims of the FTCA: Congress, in passing the discretionary func-
tion exception, wanted to shield the government from liability based 
upon the decisions its employees make within their discretion.102 The 
border patrol was fulfilling its duty of deporting illegal aliens, as is al-
lowed under the statute, and removing Ms. Castro’s daughter from the 
country was incidental to that action.103 Were Ms. Castro to have pre-
vailed, the government would have been rendered liable for all sorts of 
similar incidental actions that occur when agencies act within their 
statutory authority; such open-ended liability is far beyond the limited 
waiver of sovereign immunity that is contemplated by the FTCA.104 
Conclusion 
 The border patrol in Castro was put in the difficult situation of hav-
ing to either make a custody decision or deport an American child; nei-
ther option was attractive. Given that the discretionary function excep-
tion was drafted to shield the government from liability when its 
officials make exactly these types of difficult policy decisions, the major-
ity reached the right decision. The majority’s argument rests on a literal 
interpretation of the Gaubert prongs, which excludes the Constitution 
from its sources of mandatory guidance. This stands in contrast to the 
Dennis and Stewart approaches, which attempt to circumvent the Su-
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preme Court’s holding in FDIC v. Meyer while making the government 
liable essentially for being trapped in a situation with no perfect op-
tions. The majority approach stayed truer to Supreme Court precedent 
in applying the discretionary function exception because it was more 
faithful to the exception’s purpose of shielding decision-makers from 
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